UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-30-2019

Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust v. Cazier Appellant's Brief Dckt.
46852

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust v. Cazier Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46852" (2019). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs, All. 7888.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7888

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
7/30/2019 5:27 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Melanie Gagnepain, Deputy Clerk

Kurt Schwab
Post Falls Law I Rathdrum Law
806 E. Polston Ave, Suite B
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Ph: 208-262-3893 I Fax: 208-262-3894
Kurt@PostFallsLaw.com
For Service: Service@PostFallsLaw.com
ISB No. 9210
Attorneys for Defendants, Land Renewal Management, Inc. and Charles Drake Cazier.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE LOLA L. CAZIER REVOCABLE
TRUST,

District Court
Case No.: CV28-18-7030

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 46852-2019

vs.
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
CHARLES DRAKE CAZIER; LAND
RENEWAL MANAGEMENT, INC. an
Idaho corporation; AND JOHN DOES
I-X;
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

APPEL FROM THE DISTRICT DIVISION OF
THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, KOOTENAI COUNTY

IDAHO SUPREME/APPEALS COURT

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

1

Kurt Schwab
Post Falls Law I Rathdrum Law
806 E. Polston Ave, Suite B
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Ph: 208-262-3893 I Fax: 208-262-3894
Kurt@PostFallsLaw.com
For Service: Service@PostFallsLaw.com
ISB No. 9210

Attorney For Defendants/Appellants

Randall C. Probasco
Post Office Box 3641
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Telephone: (208) 930-0875
randall@rplawcda.com

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .. ... ........ .... ............ ..... ................ .4-5
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .................... .. .......... ... ........... ... ....... ...... .. 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....... .... ...... . .. ................................................. 7-8
STANDARD OF REVIEW . ...... ....... ... ...... ..... ......... ... ............ ................... 8-9
ARGUMENT ............................................... .... ........... .. .... ...... . ............ 9-32
CONCLUSION ....... ..... ......................................................... .... ......... . .33

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

3

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254,220 P.3d 1079.

29,30

Clarkv. Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 409 P.3d 795,802 (2017).

13

Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,873,204 P.3d 508,513 (2009).

8,10, 12, 14

Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 398-99 (2010).

26

Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420
(2012).

16

Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 10, 189 P.3d 467, 472-72 (2008).

17, 23, 24,
26

Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho 194, 196,296 P.3d 400,402 (2013).

23

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho
518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001).

24,26

Parsons v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614,
618 (2007).

23

Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 89,356
P.3d 377, 382 (2015).

9,21

Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 86 P.3d 475, 483
(2004).

31

State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424,426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002).

20

United States ofAmerica v. Malcolm A. French, et al, Dist. Court, (D.
Maine, 2018. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202327 *; 2018 WL 6251365. This
Case is attached, pertinent information under II Legal issues page 1.

22

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
4

Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 106, 218 P .3d 1150, 1167
(2009).

8

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865,264 P.3d, 970, 972 (2011).

9

Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,632,329
P.3d 1072, 1080-181 (2014).

23

RULES
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4.l(a)

10

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8

11

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

13, 14, 16,
26,27
10

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 603

6, 20, 21,
23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28,
30, 31
17
22

Idaho Rule of Evidence 801

18

Idaho Rule of Evidence 803
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5)

18, 19, 22
32

Idaho Appellate Rule 40

32

-

STATUTES
Idaho Code § 3-420

28,30,31

Idaho Code § 5-404

11

Idaho Code § 6-402

27

Idaho Code§ 12-121

24, 25, 33
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

5

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing all of
the cross claims [counter-claims] alleged by Appellant Charles Drake Cazier
when there existed a genuine issue of law and fact.

II.

Whether Appellant Land Renewal Management should have been dismissed
from the Case after filing a motion to dismiss and in requesting to be dismissed
in summary judgment.

III.

Whether the Court abused its discretion when it determined that the
Respondent's spendthrift argument was allowed, when the court struck portions
of the Affidavit of K. Schwab, and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing for
attorney fees.

IV.

Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; whether it was
an abuse of discretion to award an attorney for the unlawful practice of law; and
whether attorney fees should be been granted where Appellant LRM requested
at the first of the case to be dismissed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 16, 1999, Land Renewal Management (hereinafter Appellant LRM)
entered into a "Letter Of Agreement" (hereinafter "Agreement) with Dell Cazier and Lola
Cazier to purchase property (hereinafter "Property"). [R. at 21.] The Property has a legal
description as follows:
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Kootenai County Parcel No. 53N04W221600. A strip or piece of
land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet wide on each side of the centerline of the
Railroad as the same was located, surveyed and established across the West
half of the Northeast quarter and the Northwest quarter of the Southeast
quarter of Section 22, Township 53 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho, by Right of Way Deed recorded May 8, 1908, in
Book 28 of Deeds at page 591, records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
The Agreement gave Appellant LRM the right to purchase the Property. Six months
after the creation of the Agreement, Dell Cazier passed. [R. at 25.] Several years
after the passing of Dell Cazier, the Property was conveyed to the Lola L. Cazier
Revocable Trust. [R at 10, line 11.] Despite efforts from Appellant Cazier to
purchase the Property, Lola Cazier did not respond to communications from
Appellant Cazier. [Rat 25, line 9.] Approximately eighteen years after the
Agreement was signed, Appellant Cazier, on March 15, 2017, created an affidavit
and filed the same with the Recorder's office. [Rat 19-20.]

On August 31, 2018,

litigation was initiated by the Trustee of the Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust
(hereinafter ''Respondent"). [Rat 8.]
The basis of the quiet title and declaratory judgment claims appears to be the
Affidavit filed by Appellant Cazier with the Kootenai County Recorder's Office. The
Affidavit of Appellant Cazier asserted that he had the right to purchase the Property.
The Affidavit was signed only by Appellant Cazier. Appellant LRM was not listed
on the Affidavit, and Appellant Cazier did not sign the affidavit as a representative of
Appellant LRM. Appellant LRM responded to Respondents Verified Complaint on
October 11, 2018. [Rat 23.] Appellant LRM's Answer did not include a
counterclaim. Appellant Cazier' s Answer and Cross claim did assert a cross claim
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[counter-claim] pursuant to the Third Amendment to the Lola L. Cazier Revocable
Trust (hereinafter "Trust").

STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are three standards of review in this matter. The first standard of review is
for an appeal from a ruling in regards to summary judgment. This standard is set forth by
the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
This Court engages the same standard as the district court in
evaluating an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. The burden of
proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. All disputed
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. If reasonable people might reach a different
conclusion from conflicting inferences based on the evidence then the
motion must be denied. If the evidence is conflicting on material issues or
supports conflicting inferences, or if reasonable minds could reach differing
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009) (internal cites omitted).
The second standard of review that will be employed is the abuse of discretion
standard. The abuse of discretion standard is set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court as
follows:
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings
under the abuse of discretion standard. These include challenges to a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude documentary and/or testimonial
evidence. "Error is disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the
trial court's discretion and affects a substantial right of the party. To
determine if there has been an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the
following three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Vreeken v. Lockwood
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89,106,218 P.3d 1150, 1167 (2009) (internal cites
omitted).

The third standard of review will focus on statutory interpretation. The
interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw that the Supreme Court reviews de
novo. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,865,264 P.3d 970,972 (2011). The standard
for a question of law is set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
The object of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative intent.
Interpretation of a statute begins with the statute's literal words. The statute
should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meanings. The Court must give effect to all the words
and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give
effect to the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in
statutory construction. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty.,
159 Idaho 84, 89,356 P.3d 377,382 (2015) (internal cites omitted).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CROSS-CLAIM [COUNTER-CLAIMS]
MADE BY APPELLANT CHARLES DRAKE CAZIER WHEN THERE
EXISTED A GENUINE ISSUE OF LAW AND FACT.

The Standard for summary judgment is as follows:
This Court engages the same standard as the district court in
evaluating an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden of
proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. All disputed
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. If reasonable people might reach a different
conclusion from conflicting inferences based on the evidence then the
motion must be denied. If the evidence is conflicting on material issues or
supports conflicting inferences, or if reasonable minds could reach differing
APPELLANTS ' OPENING BRIEF
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conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009) (internal cites omitted).

Here, the Court was in error to grant summary judgment against Appellant Cazier.
The standard of judgment is to construe all evidence in a light most favorable to Appellant
Cazier. In addition, all disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of Appellant
Cazier. Appellant Cazier asserted a cross complaint against the Respondent in the
underlying case. [Rat 25-28.] Appellant Cazier's cross complaint was dismissed with
prejudice in summary judgment on the basis that the cross claim did not state a cause of
action against the trust. [R. at 229.], Tr Transcr 27:12-15. No further information or
analysis is given as to the basis or rational of the decision to dismiss Appellant's cross
claim. No Idaho statute, rule, or case was referred to in making this decision. However,
despite the lack of basis for the decision, there is ample foundation in law, rule, and statute
for the claim made by Appellant Cazier in regards to the Third Trust Amendment.
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "1.R.C.P.") 4.l(a), the
voluntary appearance of a party or service of any pleading by the party constitutes
voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the Court. I.R.C.P. 4.l(a). By filing
the action in Kootenai County, Respondent submitted itself to the jurisdiction of Idaho
Courts. Furthermore, according to the filings in this case, there is no exception claimed by
Respondent to I.R.C.P. 4.l(a). With jurisdiction established and in accordance with Idaho
Code § 5-404, venue is proper as this matter was filed in the county in which the
defendant, Appellant Cazier resided. After the matter was initiated by the Respondent,
Appellant Cazier responded. In addition to Answering, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 13{b),
Appellant Cazier to asserted a counter claim that was mislabeled as a cross claim.
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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According to the Answer and Cross Complaint filed by Appellant Cazier,
Appellant Cazier asserted his rights under the Third Amendment to the Lola L. Cazier
Revocable Trust (hereinafter "Third Trust Amendment"). [Rat 27, line 26.] The Third
Trust Amendment is found in the Clerks Record on pages 75-77. [R. at 75-77.] The
following language is contained in the Third Trust Amendment, Paragraph 2(b):
b. The remaining undivided one-half interest (1/2) shall be distributed in
equal shares to KATHY DELL TRACY, MERRILL DEAN CAZIER.
MELANIE R. THOMPSON, and KIMBERLY D. HOWARD, provided,
however, that the share of KIMBERLY D. HOWARD shall be reduced by
any amounts she may owe her siblings at time of Grantor's death, and said
amounts shall be added to the share of the sibling or siblings she owes.
Grantor directs the Trustee to adjust the shares based on the amount owed
by KIMBERLY D. HOWARD to her siblings regardless if the loan is
barred by the statute of limitations or is for some other reason is legally
enforceable.
Grantor is intentionally leaving nothing to Charles Drake Cazier or his
children. She is also intentionally leaving nothing to Monty Noel Cazier or
his children as she has previously gifted Monty Noel Cazier the sum of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
3. In the event any of the beneficiaries named and designated in paragraph 2
above shall fail to survive Grantor by thirty (30) days, then the share of such
deceased beneficiary shall be distributed equally to his or her issue, per
stirpes, except as set forth in Paragraph 5 below.

Appellant Cazier, in his Answer and Cross Complaint, asserted that, as a sibling, he
was requesting reimbursement from the trust for money lent to Kimberly D. Howard. [R at
27-28.] Kimberly Howard is the sister of Appellant Cazier. Appellant's claim was simple
and straight forward. In accordance with I.R.C.P. 8, Appellant Cazier had a short and plain
statement showing that he was entitled to relief as a sibling who had lent money to
Kimberly D. Howard. In regards to amounts owed, Appellant reserved the right to add
specific and additional relief once the distributions and operations of the Trust were made
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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clear. [Rat 28]. Appellant at the time of his answer could not state what he was collecting
from Kimberly D. Howard's portion due to not knowing what Kimberly Howard was
receiving from the Trust. Appellant Cazier completely satisfied I.R.C.P. 8 in asserting a
claim that was specifically outlined and set forth in the Third Trust Amendment.
The fact that the Third Trust Amendment allows a sibling to seek reimbursement
from a sibling must be construed liberally in a light most favorable to Appellant Cazier.

Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,873,204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009). With the trust language
construed liberally in favor of Appellant Cazier, and as an undisputed fact, Appellant
Cazier is a sibling according to the Third Trust Amendment. There is no exclusion in the
Trust disclaiming Appellant Cazier as a sibling. Indeed, where beneficiaries are
specifically addressed in paragraph 3, the Grantor could have easily used the word
''beneficiary" rather than "sibling." Yet the Grantor did not. This fact must be construed in
Appellant Cazier's favor as required by law. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,873,204
P.3d 508, 513 (2009).
Appellant Cazier is a sibling of Kimberly D. Howard. The Third Trust Amendment
gives specific right for Appellant Cazier to assert a claim against Kimberly D. Howard.
Kimberly D. Howard owes money to her sibling, Appellant Cazier. With these facts
liberally construed in Appellant Cazier's favor, and all reasonable inferences being drawn
in his favor, Appellant Cazier stated a claim against the Trust which relief could be
granted, namely, reimbursement for money loaned to Kimberly D. Howard in accordance
with the Third Trust Amendment.

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Due the above listed reasons, Appellant Cazier requests this Court reverse the
District Court decision of dismissing Appellant Cazier's cross claims with prejudice,
vacate the attorney fees and costs awarded, and remand this matter for further proceedings.
II.

LAND RENEWAL MANAGEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED FROM THE CASE.

On January 9, 2019, Appellant LRM filed a Motion to Dismiss. [R. at 144] Appellant
LRM's motion asserted that according to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Respondent failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The claims made by Respondent are that prior to
filing, Appellant LRM had somehow challenged Respondent's ownership of the Property
and/or that Appellant LRM had improperly encumbered the Property. However, this
Motion was not noticed for a hearing due to the ability to bring the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) issue
in response to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. In Appellant LRM's

Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
issue was raised. [Rat 136.] This method ofraising a 12(b)(6) in a summary judgment
does cause a question as to the application oflaw due to the standards being applied in this
situation. A I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion is governed by the following law:
When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, we look only to the pleadings to
determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. A motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief. On review, this Court draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Clark v. Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 409 P.3d 795, 802 (2017).
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However, I.R.C.P.12(b)(6) motion was a defense asserted by Appellant LRM in a Motion
for Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Judgment was brought by Respondent
against Appellant LRM, and the standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment requires:
This Court engages the same standard as the district court in evaluating an
appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file
with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proving the absence of
material facts is upon the moving party. All disputed facts are to be
construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party. If reasonable people might reach a different conclusion
from conflicting inferences based on the evidence then the motion must be
denied. If the evidence is conflicting on material issues or supports
conflicting inferences, or if reasonable minds could reach differing
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868,873, 204 P.3d 508,513 (2009) (internal cites omitted).

The application of the above cited standards creates a question as to which standard applies
when I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is used as a defense in a summary judgment. Appellant LRM
requested that the Court view the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion as a defense and view the
12{b)(6) defense with all facts and inferences being in favor of Appellant LRM and in a
light most favorable to Appellant LRM. Using this standard, LRM should have been
dismissed in this matter.
First, in viewing Respondent's Verified Complaint there was not a single piece of
evidence put forth by Respondent showing that LRM had asserted any claims or asserted
any interest in the Property. [R. at 8-22.] There is not a single line of the Verified
Complaint showing a claim made by Appellant LRM against the Property. Indeed, any
allegation that the cloud on title was caused by LRM is fully addressed in Respondent's
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own letter to Appellant Cazier. [R. at 114-115.] Based on the Verified Complaint, and
construing all facts in Appellant LRM's favor, and viewing the matter in a light most
favorable to Appellant LRM, the Verified Complaint did not actually assert a single claim
in which relief could be granted on the basis of Appellant LRM's actions.

It is true that in Appellant LRM's Answer, Appellant LRM requested the district
court allow Appellant LRM to retain an interest in the Property. However, this request was
in the prayer for relief in response to litigation. Litigation initiated by Respondent which
frivolously named Appellant LRM. To be sure, it was no more frivolous to respond to the
litigation than it was frivolous for Respondent to bring the litigation. Indeed, where
Appellant LRM had made no claim prior to the lawsuit, it was not necessary for Appellant
LRM to be named in Respondent's lawsuit. If Appellant LRM had not been named in the
lawsuit, there would have been no reason for Appellant LRM to respond. However, there
was a claim, and Appellant LRM did answer. Yet despite answering, Appellant LRM did
not assert a counterclaim.
I.R.C.P 13 states that "A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim, that, at
the time of its service, the pleader has against an opposing party .... " In viewing Appellant
LRM's Answer, there is no counterclaim. [Rat 32.] In reviewing Respondents pleadings,
there is no answer to counterclaim. In other words, no counter claim was made against
Respondent which Respondent felt a need to respond to. It should not be given any weight
that in the prayer for relief, Appellant LRM, requested the Court to retain an interest in the
disputed Property. Pleadings are replete with requests for attorney fees, and many other
requests are made in the prayers for relief, but those requests do not rise to the level of a
claim as set forth in I.R.C.P.13.
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Appellant LRM's Answer must also be understood in light of an offer letter from
the Respondent sent on July 23, 2018. [Rat 114.] This letter was included in Respondent's
documents in regards to summary judgment. [Rat 99, 114.] In the July 23, 2018 letter,
Respondent had made an open offer forthe purchase of the disputed Property to Appellant
Cazier. [Record at 114.] The offer specifically made reference to the Agreement. [Record
at 114.] The Agreement was the document setting forth the terms of Property sale between
LRM and the Caziers. Where Respondent in the letter asserted that the purchase of the
land was to be made in accordance with the Agreement, it is reasonable that Appellant
LRM thought it may still have interest in the Property.
Following Appellant LRM's Answer, the next document filed was the I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) motion to then the Memorandum in reply to Respondents Summary Judgment.
Neither document made claims of interest to the Property. Indeed, LRM stated that it had
no interest and should be released from the case. [Rat 135.]
Where everything is construed in a light most favorable to Appellant LRM,
Appellant LRM should have been released from the case under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
Appellant LRM requests, for the above reasons, that the attorney fees be vacated, that this
matter be remanded to the district court, and that Appellant LRM be dismissed from this
case because Respondents have not asserted a claim for which relief can be granted.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION ON SEVERAL
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, the standard applied is an abuse of
discretion. Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012).
Abuse of discretion is a three part test which is set forth as follows:
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks whether
the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5,
10, 189 P .3d 467, 4 72-72 (2008).
In this matter there are several evidentiary issues that will be raised. The first is the
district court's decision to overrule Appellant's objection to Respondent's
argument in regards to the spendthrift provision in the Trust. Tr. Transcr. page 23,
line 2-25 and page 24, lines 1-23.
The spendthrift argument was not raised in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(a).
I.R.C.P. 56(a) requires that a party identify each claim or defense. I.R.C.P. 56(a).
Respondent raised the issue of the spendthrift trust as a defense to Appellant Cazier
asserting his claim of reimbursement in accordance with the Third Trust
Amendment. However, the spendthrift argument is not found anywhere in
Respondent's documents in regards to summary Judgment. Where Respondent
failed to raise the spendthrift argument in its motion for summary judgment
pleadings, the argument should have been struck. Furthermore, even if the
argument is not struck, the spendthrift argument gives great weight to Appellant
Caziers claim as Respondent felt the necessity of providing a defense.
The second evidentiary ruling in this matter is the district court's decision to
strike portions of the Affidavit ofKurt Schwab in Support of Objection to Attorney
Fees and Costs. Tr. Transcr. page 32, page 8, line 8-25 and page 33, page 9, line 17. Specifically, the district court struck paragraphs 9, 11, and 12 on the ground of
hearsay. [Rat 273.]

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
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According to Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter "I.R.E.") 801, all out of
court statements offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement are hearsay. I.R.E. 801(a)-(c). Hearsay exceptions to the Idaho Rules
of Evidence are found in I.RE 803. On such exception that is applicable here, is
I.R.E. 803(1). I.RE. 803(1) provides an exception to hearsay for a present sense
impression. I.R.E. 803(1). Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit ofKurt Schwab in support
of objection to Attorney Fees and Costs states:

At this time, Mr. Probasco and I discussed if an assignment might assist in
having LRM dismissed from the case. After discussion I was under the
impression that an assignment may assist in having LRM dismissed from
the case. [R. at 215.J
As the statement reads, paragraph 12 is Attorney Schwab's perception of an event
in regards to why an assignment was created in this case. The exception to hearsay
should apply and the statement should have been allowed into the argument to
determine attorney fee reasonableness.
The next exception to hearsay that applies to this situation is I.RE. 803(24).
I.R.E 803(24) is a catch all to the exception to hearsay. I.RE. 803(24) allows a
hearsay exception if:
i. The statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
ii. it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
iii. it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
iv. admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice.
(B) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing,
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer
the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and
address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.
The statements made in paragraph 9, 11, and 12 are as follows:
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9. As part of the discussion I requested that Mr. Probasco release
LRM from the case and allow a dismissal of LRM
11. As shown by Plaintiff's Memorandum, Exhibit 1, page 2, on
October 11, 2018, I again called Mr. Probasco. I let him know that Post
Falls Law would be appearing for LRM. I requested again that LRM be
dismissed from the case. The request was denied
12. At this time, Mr. Probasco and I discussed if an assignment
might assist in having LRM dismissed from the case. After discussion I
was under the impression that an assignment may assist in having LRM
dismissed from the case
In evaluating the decision to strike, the district court correctly perceived that this
was an issue of discretion. However, the district court failed to apply the correct
legal standard which allowed an exception to hearsay. Here, I.RE. 803(24)
applies. The statements were trustworthy, they were offered as a material fact in
regards to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, it was more probative on point
than other evidence that could have been offered, and admitting it fulfills the
purpose of providing information as to the reasonableness of attorney fees. Finally,
the notice requirement was met because the Affidavit ofKurt Schwab in support of

objection to Attorney Fees and Costs gave notice of the intention to offer the
statement and it included the particulars of my contact information. It was crucial
for a correct analysis of the reasonableness requirement of attorney fees for the
court to understand that Appellant LRM had been requesting to be dismissed from
the beginning of the case. It is unclear why Appellants attachment of the Third
Trust Amendment was struck as it was already part of the record. Tr. Transcr 23: 11
The district court's decision to strike the statements and attachments should
be reversed and remanded as it would allow Appellant LRM to show the attorney
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fees were not reasonable, or required, due to Appellant LRM's repeated requests to
be dismissed from the case.
The third ground asserted as to why the portions of the affidavit should not
have been struck, or why all affidavits should have struck, is raised by the district
court when asking counsel "So are you making the argument the Idaho Rules of
Evidence don't apply in a motion for attorney's fees hearing?" Tr. Transcr. page
32, page 5, lines 22-24. Based on Attorney Schwab's practice experience, the
answer to this question is yes. No Court had previously applied the rules of
hearsay to the proceedings involving attorney fees and costs. The hearsay rule as
applied to attorney fees and costs appeared to be inapplicable to I.R.C.P 54(d)(4)(5) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5)-(6). However, where attorney fees were objected to, and
the district court held that the rules of evidence apply, then the district court's
decision regarding attorney fees and costs would still be incorrect and must be
remanded for further proceedings for failure to follow Idaho evidentiary rules.

It is important to note that at this juncture, the standard of review would
change from an abuse of discretion to de novo. Here, the Court would need to
interpret both a statute and an evidentiary rule. The interpretation of a statute is a
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137
Idaho 424,426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002). The standard for statutory interpretation
is as follows:
The object of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative intent.
Interpretation of a statute begins with the statute's literal words. The statute
should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meanings. The Court must give effect to all the words
and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or
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redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give
effect to the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in
statutory construction. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty.,
159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015)(internal cites omitted).

Here the rule being interpreted is I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) which states:
(6) Objection to Attorney Fees. Any objection to a claim for attorney fees
must be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by
Rule 54(d)(5). The court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, if it deems it
necessary, regarding the award of attorney fees. I.R. C.P. 54(e)(6)

Taken as a whole, and giving effect to all the words, the legislature clearly required
an evidentiary hearing to be held when there is an objection to attorney fees. In this
case, there was an objection to attorney fees. After the objection to attorney fees
and affidavit in support of the objection were filed, the district court exercised the
option for an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 3,
2019. [R. at 6.] The term "evidentiary hearing" is not defined in the rule or in
Idaho Law but the common usage of"evidentiary hearing" is found in Black's Law
Dictionary.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, is "[a] hearing at which evidence is
presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal argument is presented."
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (10th ed. 2014).
Although not an Idaho Court, the term "evidentiary hearing" has been further
defined as:
Under the law, an evidentiary hearing is a hearing to try issues of fact. The
term 'evidentiary hearing' defines itself. A hearing in a court context, is a
judicial session, usually open to the public, held for the purpose of deciding
issues of fact or oflaw, sometimes with witnesses testifying. The First
Circuit's use of adjective, "evidentiary," emphasizes that the hearing on
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remand must include the taking of evidence, and under basic concepts of
due process, an evidentiary hearing includes placing witnesses under oath
and allowing cross-examination. ("evidentiary hearing" means "[a] hearing
at which evidence is presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal
argument is presented"). United States ofAmerica v. Malcolm A. French, et
al, Dist. Court, (D. Maine, 2018). Brief attached to appeal due to difficulty
in citing the case, pertinent portion starts on Page 1, II. Legal issues.
Where an evidentiary hearing is to be held, the Idaho Rules of Evidence
would apply. The statute should be interpreted to require an evidentiary hearing as
set forth above. Here, no evidentiary hearing in accordance with the rules was
held.
Although there was oral argument, there was no testimony. I.R.E 603
requires that before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify
truthfully. In this matter, no individuals were administered an oath in accordance
with I.R.E. 603. In regards to documents, none were entered.
The district court could not rely on Respondent's Memorandum of Costs
and Declaration ofFees and all attachments as the document is hearsay and bared

by I.R.E. 803. Moreover, any allegations contained in the Declaration ofM. Patton
Echols would be barred due to I.R.E. 803. Respondent did not request any
documents to be entered as evidence in this matter. Nor did the Court allow any
exhibits to be entered at the hearing. Issues of authentication did not arise, as no
document was presented to be entered into evidence.
Without testimony and without any documents being entered into evidence
at the hearing, the award of attorney fees must be vacated as the district court had
no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing held in this matter. Without
evidence, the court would have no basis for entering a judgment or order. Due to
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the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, Appellants request that this court remand
the attorney fees to the district court for further proceedings in regards to the
evidentiary hearing required by I.R. C.P. 54(e)(6).
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS IN THIS MATTER.

The trial court has discretion to award attorney fees and costs; that award is subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho 194, 196, 296 P .3d 400, 402
(2013). The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is also reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Parsons v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d
614, 618 (2007). The abuse of discretions standard is set forth as follows:
Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks
whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
When awarding attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that
the court deems appropriate. Though it is not necessary the court address all
of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate
the court considered all of the factors. Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 10,
189 P.3d 467, 472-72 (2008).
According to Idaho Code§ 12-121, "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has further elucidated that an award of attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code §12-121 is not a matter of right. Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v.
Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,632,329 P.3d 1072, 1080-181 (2014). Nor are attorney fees
awarded for arguments that are based in good faith. See Id., internal cites omitted. Finally,
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When deciding whether the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the
litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable
issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under LC.§ 12-121 even
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702
(2001) (internal cites omitted).
"When a court awards attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 it must make a written
finding as to the basis and reasons for awarding the attorney fees." Lee v. Nickerson, 189
P.3d 474, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).
Here the Court did not meet the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 54(e). First, the Court did
not make a written finding as required by the rule. The Order, as issued from the Court on
January 28, 2019 contained only the language:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Plaintiff, The Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust shall have and recover from
the Defendants a judgment awarding attorney fees and costs in the amount
to be determined by this Court after submission of a memorandum of costs
by Plaintiffs counsel. [R at 241.]

The Judgment, as issued from the Court on January 28, 2019, also failed to comply with
the requirements as outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). The only language contained in the
Judgment states:
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the Plaintiff is awarded costs and attorney fees in the amount to be
determined, plus interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date hereof until
paid in full. [Rat 245.]

Neither the Order or the Judgment complied with I.R.C.P 54(e). The required grounds of a
basis and reason, were not given. Furthermore, the Order and Judgment were not written
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by the Judge. It appears Respondent understood that the Order and Judgment were
lacking. On page 36 of the Transcript Record, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Probasco: "Your honor, where this is an award based upon frivolous and unreasonable
conduct of defendants would it be necessary for the Court to draft an order
addressing that issue on the fees?"
The Court:

"Well, I think I already made that ruling back on January 28th ."

Mr. Probasco: "I guess my concern is I don't want it to be an issue that there wasn't a
written order on that." Tr. Transcr. Page 36, page 17, line 20-25 and page
36, page 18, line 1-7.
Based on the statements it appears that, Respondent's counsel did not believe there was a
written order that complied with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). Appellants would agree. Yet, the
district court, rather than writing the basis and reasons for the award, assigned it to
counsel.
The Supreme Court has stated that "When a court awards attorney fees pursuant to
J.C.§ 12-121 it must make a written finding as to the basis and reasons for awarding the
attorney fees." Lee v. Nickerson, 189 P.3d 474. Here, the district court failed to comply
with the requirement to make a written finding. In addition to the writing requirement
failure, there is still the larger failure in the Amended Judgment and second Order to
comply with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) in providing a basis and reasons for the award of attorney
fees.
The Order and Judgment, and subsequent Amended Judgment and second Order
created by Respondent, and signed by the district court, fail to comply with I.R.C.P.
54(e)(2) or the applicable case law. see Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington
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Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). The analysis in applying the standard
for awarding fees and costs starts with taking the entire course of the litigation into
account. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 398-99 (2010). If even
one legitimate issue was presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the
losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation. Id. 246 P.3d 398-99. Here, there are many issues, not just one.
The second Order does not break down Appellant Cazier' s cross claim against the
Trust. There is no reasoning as to why Appellant Cazier's cross claim was not addressed.
No case law, no rule, no statute, no analysis, and no basis. In fact, the only ground
provided on the oral record is that "I find the dismissal of the counterclaim as appropriate,
that it doesn't state a cause of action against the trust. I'll leave it at that." Tr. Transcr. Page
27, line 12-15. Even if the Court accepts "failure to state a claim" as the basis, the rule
requires more; the rule requires the basis and reasons. See Lee v. Nickerson, 189 P .3d 4 74;
see I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). In regards to the required basis and reasons in the written order,
none are provided. Moreover, the basis and reasons for Appellant LRM's request to be
dismissed in accordance with I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) are also left out entirely.
The second Order also violates the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2), when it states
"That as determined herein and on the record of the hearings held on January 23 and April
3, 2019, ...." The rule requires that the basis and reasons for attorney fees be written.
There is no exception to that rule. Both the original Order and second Order fail to comply
with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).
Although the district court correctly perceived that the issue of attorney fees and
costs was discretionary, the court failed to act within the boundaries of its discretion and
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

26

was not consist with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it.
The district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Due to these abuses,
the Judgment and Order should be remanded for further findings.
The district court also appears to have granted attorney fees for failure to employ
Idaho Code§ 6-402. The district court specifically stated that "I find fees are warranted
under 6-402." Tr. Transcr page 34, page 16, line 1-2. Idaho Code§ 6-402 provides no
basis for an award of attorney fees, so any attorney fees granted under this section would
be incorrect. While Idaho Code § 6-402 does provide a possible method to avoid costs by
disclaiming an interest in property, Idaho Code§ 6-402 is not mandatory. There is no
"shall" requirement to employ Idaho Code § 6-402. In addition, the request to treat
Appellant LRM's response in accordance with Idaho Code§ 6-402 was one line of
Appellant LRM's response to summary judgment. Despite the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) argument
being the bulk of Appellant LRM's memorandum in objection to attorney fees, this
argument was entirely ignored by the district court.
For the above stated reasons, this Court should reverse and vacate the award of
attorney fees, and remand this matter for further findings as required by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).
A second issue flowing from the award of attorney fees and costs, is the
reasonableness of the attorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) establishes that a party may object
to attorney fees in the same matter as provided in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5)
allows an objection to disallow part or all costs. In this case, the attorney fees should be
entirely vacated, but even if the Court does not vacate all of the fees, there are multiple
grounds to reduce the attorney fees award. The reasons, which, if analyzed, would be
grounds for reducing or eliminating attorney fees and costs. The first reduction to the costs
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and fees should be the litigation and drafting surrounding Respondent's Motion for
Attorney Fees.
The district court failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). This was recognized by
Respondent. Tr. Transcr page 35, page 17, line 20-25, and page 18, line 1-7. Appellants
filed an objection to attorney fees and costs. Appellants should not be punished with
attorney fees for raising the legitimate issue that the court had not complied with the
standards as set for in I.R.C.P. 54. All attorney fees and costs on the basis of the
Appellant's Objection to attorney fees and costs should be vacated. The second reduction
of attorney fees, if any are granted, find their foundation in the objection to the
unauthorized practice of law.
Attorney fees and costs should not be awarded for the unauthorized practice oflaw
by M. Patton Echols. Idaho Code§ 3-420 forbids the unlawful practice oflaw.
Specifically, the statute states:
If any person shall, without having become duly admitted and licensed to
practice law within this state or whose right or license to practice therein
shall have terminated either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his
license or otherwise, practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the
public as a person qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer
within this state, he shall be guilty of an offense under this act, and on
conviction thereof be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or be
imprisoned for a period of not to exceed six (6) months, or both, and if he
shall have been admitted to practice law he shall in addition be subject to
suspension under the proceedings provided by this act. Idaho Code § 3-420.

The Court has further clarified that "The practice of law has been defined as doing or
performing services in a court of justice, in any matter ... in a larger sense, it includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts through which legal
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rights are secured .... 11 Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 220 P.3d
1073, 1079 (2009).
M. Patton Echols is the attorney for Respondent in Oregon. M. Patton Echols is
not admitted or licensed to practice law in Idaho. Yet, M. Patton Echols held himself out to
Appellant Cazier as a person qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within
Idaho. See [Rat 196.] According to M. Patton Echols Declaration, page 195-196, all of
the work completed was in regards to the Property in Idaho. [R. at 195-196.] Looking at
the first 1. 7 hours of attorney time, the time was spent on discussing the Property in Idaho.
M. Patton Echols had no business commenting on Idaho laws or rules in regards to the
Property. In discussing the Property for one hour and forty-eight minutes, M. Patton
Echols was holding himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice law in Idaho.
It is believed M. Patton Echols was speaking to the public, as the person he was speaking
with was named "Romero." Romero is not the named Trustee of the Trust. In fact, the
person listed as the Trustee is Cheryl Lynn Witkowski; there are no other listed co-trustees.
[Record at 55.] Where "Romero" is not the Trustee, he had no business discussing the
case at all. [Record at 55], Article IX lists Cheryl Lynn Witkowski as the Trustee. It is
also, unclear why M. Patton Echols needed an hour and forty-eight minutes to tell Romero
that he would need to seek the counsel of an Idaho attorney. Yet, this phone call was only
the beginning ofM. Patton Echols unauthorized practice oflaw.
M. Patton Echols then proceeded to contact Appellant Cazier by phone. [R. at
196.] Which was followed by an offer letter to Appellant Cazier. [R. at 196.] Per the
Declaration, M. Patton Echols prepared the offer letter and had spoken to Appellant Cazier
before preparing the offer. [Rat 196.] The preparation and sending of an offer letter
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violate the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of giving legal advice and counsel
without the proper authority. See Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254,
220 P.3d 1079. The preparation of the offer letter was a document trying to secure legal
rights in violation ofldaho Code § 3-420. Even after the failed settlement offers, M.
Patton Echols continued to give counsel and advice about the Idaho Property.
This legal advice and legal counsel appear to be for Dale, Merril, Romero, Monte,
and other beneficiaries who are not the representative of the Trust. See [R at 196.] M.
Patton Echols also reviewed the counterclaims of Appellant Cazier, reviewed the Trust,
and replied to Attorney Probasco. [R. at 196.] Not only had M. Patton Echols created an
offer, discussed the offer with Appellant Cazier, received a response to the offer from
Appellant Cazier, but M. Patton Echols then reviewed the Idaho pleadings and appeared to
give advice and counsel on the pleadings. [Rat 196.] M. Patton Echols violated Idaho Rule
§ 3-420 by giving legal advice, legal counsel, reviewing Idaho pleadings, and preparing

instruments in which legal rights were being secured.
M. Patton Echols was not qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer
within Idaho. M. Patton Echols was not an expert for this case, nor could he provide any
counsel that Attorney Probasco would not already know as far as Idaho Law. Where M.
Patton Echols violated Idaho Rule 3-420, the district court abused its discretion. Although
the district court correctly perceived the attorney fee issue as discretionary, the district
court acted outside its boundaries by rewarding attorney fees for the violation of Idaho
Law. The attorney fees and costs requested for M. Patton Echols should be vacated.
The third issue with the award of attorney fees revolves around I.R.C.P. 54(e).
I.R.C.P 54(e) allows for a court to award reasonable attorney fees. The "reasonableness"
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of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's consideration of the factors in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3). Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 86 P.3d 475,483
(2004). The factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) include: time and labor; difficulty; skill required;
prevailing charges; fixed or contingent fee; time limitations; amount and result;
undesirability of the case; relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; costs of
automated research; and any other factors. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas

Refinery Corp., 86 P.3d 475,483 (2004).
In this matter, the amount of time and labor asserted were not required.
Respondent's attorney spent 66. 24 hours working on this matter. [Rat 190.] However,
according to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A), attorney fees are granted only for the time and labor
required. As shown by the Affidavit ofKurt Schwab in Support of Objection to Attorney

Fees, Rat 213 - 215, Appellant LRM requested to be dismissed from the case. The
requests for dismissal occurred long before 66.24 hours were spent by Respondents
counsel. In fact, according to the Affidavit of Kurt Schwab, lines 8 and 10, these requests
occurred prior to Appellant LRM and Appellant Cazier being served with the Verified
Complaint. R. at 214, and, page 2-3. At the time Appellant LRM requested to be
dismissed, Respondent has spent only $2,200.00. [R. at 184-185.] On December 5, 2018,

As shown by the Affidavit of Kurt Schwab in Support of Objection to Attorney Fees, line
15, Appellant LRM again requested to be dismissed from the case. [Rat 214.] The request
was denied by Respondent. [R. at 214, and 215 line 17.] Respondent's denials were
unreasonable and created a situation where time and labor increased due to Respondent's
own refusal to dismiss Appellant LRM.
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Harkening back to Respondent's own pleadings, there was not a single allegation
that Appellant LRM had been included on the Affidavit that clouded title. There was no
need for a court to grant relief against Appellant LRM as LRM did nothing prior to
Respondent's initiation of the law suit. Allowing for the dismissal of Appellant LRM
would have decreased the time and labor required for this lawsuit. Respondent should not
be granted attorney fees when is the Respondent is responsible for forcing Appellant LRM
to remain the case. The failure to acknowledge that the attorney fees must be reasonable
based on time and labor required was an abuse of discretion. The court was not in line
with legal standards and there was no evaluation or analysis of Respondent's choice to
keep Appellant LRM in the case. This is in spite of the fact that in Respondent's own
pleadings where it failed to provide a foundation as to why Appellant LRM should be
included in the case.
ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5), Appellants seek and award of fees and
costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, and costs according to Idaho
Appellate Rule 40.
CONCLUSION
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Appellants respectfully requests that this
Court overturn the judgment of the District Court, vacate the attorney fees, and remand the
case for additional proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of July, 2019.
Post Falls Law

Kurt H. Schwab, Attorney for Appellants.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of July, 2019, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following:

D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D Court Box
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile to:

Randall C. Probasco
Post Office Box 3641
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Telephone: (208) 930-0875
randall@rplawcda.com

~ Electronic Service
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Opinion

I. BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2018, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit issued its mandate, remanding the Malco]m French
and Rodney Russell cases to this Court "for further
proceedings" on their motion for new trial. United States v.
French 904 F.3d 111 Ost Cir. 2018>. On November 5, 2018,
the Court denied the Defendants' (*2] motion for recusal.

United States v. French, No. J:12-cr-00160-JAW. 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188659 (D_ Me. Nov. 5, 2018). On November 20,
2018, the Court held a conference of counsel to determine
how best to respond to the First Circuit's remand. Min. Entry
(ECF No. 802).

II. LEGAL ISSUES

A. Remanded for an Evidentiary Hearing
The First Circuit in general remanded the case "to investigate
the claim,'' indicating that "[t]he type of investigation the
district court chooses to conduct is within the district court's
discretion; it may hold a formal evidentiary hearing, but
depending on the circumstances, such a hearing may not be
required.° French. 904 F. 3d at 117. Significantly, the French
Court also wrote:

ORDER ON JUROR RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Following the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's remand
to this Court for an evidentiary hearing concerning Juror 86's
responses to a jury questionnaire and her motivation behind
those responses, the Court, over the objection of the
Defendants, is going to appoint counsel to represent Juror 86.
The Court concludes that based on the record now before it,
including the appellate court's opinion, there is some potential
that Juror 86 deliberately lied during the voir dire process and
for that reason alone, she should be provided with counsel. In
addition, the Court favors the appointment of counsel for
practical reasons.

Because we are vacating and remanding for an
evidentiary hearing concerning the possible bias of Juror
86, we could defer review of the drug quantity issue ....

Id. at 122 (emphasis supplied). This Court views the First
Circuit's language as requiring on remand that the Court hold
an evidentiary hearing. Under the law, an evidentiary hearing
is a hearing "to try issues of fact." Townsend v. Sain 3 72 U.S.
293. 309 83 S. Ct. 745 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (]963J . The term
'evidentiar11 hearing' defines itself. A hearing in a court
context, is a •~udicial session, usu[ally] open to the public,
held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law,
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sometimes (*3] with witnesses testifying." BRYAN A.
GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 836 (10th ed.
2014). The First Circuit's use of adjective, "evidentiary,"
emphasizes that the hearing on remand must include the
taking of evidence, and under basic concepts of due process,
an evidentiary hearing includes placing witnesses under oath
and allowing cross-examination. Id. ("evidentiary hearing"
means "[a] hearing at which evidence is presented, as opposed
to a hearing at which only legal argument is presented").
In United States v. Sampson 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013), the
district court convened what the First Circuit described as an
"evidentiary hearing" to resolve a question of juror
misconduct. Id. at 156. The Sampson Court refers to the
juror's presentation at the evidentiary hearing as testimony. Id.
at 163 ("Juror C testified"). Furthermore, the district court
allowed defense counsel to cross-examine the juror. Id.
("When defense counsel attempted to probe her lies about P,
she resisted that line of inquiry").
Although, as the First Circuit noted, in many cases of juror
misconduct it is appropriate for the district court to convene
something less than an evidentiary hearing to investigate
claims of juror misconduct, French, 904 F.3d at 117, the
Court concludes, consistent with its interpretation of the First
Circuit directive in this case, that it (*4] should convene an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of juror misconduct
on remand.

B. The Need for the Testimony of Juror 86
The next question is whether the evidentiary hearing that the
First Circuit ordered contemplates the sworn testimony of
Juror 86. On this issue, the First Circuit observed that when a
party claims that a juror failed to respond accurately to a
question asked of prospective jurors prior to selection as a
juror, "a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to
answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then
further show that a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause." French, 904 F.3d at
116 (quoting McDonough Power Equip. , Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984)
(emphasis in McDonough)). The French Court observed that
"[t]he outcome of this inquiry depends on whether a
reasonable judge, armed with the information that the
dishonest juror failed to disclose and the reason behind the
juror's dishonesty, would [have struck the juror for cause]."
Id. (quoting Samoson 724 F.3d at 165-66 (emphasis in
French)). The First Circuit wrote that "the court may consider
factors including but not limited to 'the juror's interpersonal
relationships; the juror's ability to separate her emotions from
her duties; the similarity between [*SJ the juror's experiences

and important facts presented at trial; the scope and severity
of the juror's dishonesty; and the juror's motive for lying. 111 Id.
(quoting Sampson, 724 F.3d at 160 . The First Circuit
emphasized that "the ultimate inquiry under Sampson requires
that the court consider 'the reason behind the juror's
dishonesty.'" Id. at 118 (quoting Sampson , 724 F . 3d at 165JJ).
Although the Court remains open to the suggestions of the
parties as to how to resolve the issue of Juror 86's motivation
without calling her as a witness, it anticipates that her
testimony will be the central focus of the evidentiary hearing
on remand. Id. at 118 ("The only way to tell if the passage of
time would have erased Juror 86's memory of events would
be to ask her to recall these events, something the district
court declined to do").

C. Appointment of Counsel for Juror 86
The Government and the Defendants now appear to agree
with the Court's conclusion about the need for an evidentiary
hearing in which Juror 86 is called as a witness. 1 The parties
disagree, however, on whether the Court should appoint
counsel to represent Juror 86 in anticipation of her testimony.
Compare Letter from Att'y Thomas F. Hallett and Att'y
Jamesa J. Drake to Hon. John A. Woodcock, [*6] Jr. (Nov.
23, 2018) (ECF No. 805) (Hallett Letter) and Letter from Att'y
William S. Maddox to Hon. John A. [W]oodcock, Jr. (Nov.
23, 2018) (ECF No. 806) (Maddox Letter); with Letter from
Assistant U.S. Att'ys. Joel B. Casey and F. Todd Lowell to
Hon. John Woodcock, Jr. (ECF No. 807) (Gov't Letter).

1. The Defendants' Position
The Defendants worry that if counsel is appointed to represent
Juror 86, Juror 86 will invoke her Filth Amendment right to
remain silent and doing so will "doom at the outset this
Court's task." Hallett Letter at 1; Maddox Letter at I
("deprives the Court of it[]s truth-telling function"). Attorney
Hallett points out that in United States v. Fuentes, No. 2:12cr-50-DBH 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115459 tD. Me. Aug. 15.
2013 Judge Homby of this district conducted an interview
"in camera but on the record" and that none of the persons
interviewed, including the juror, was placed under oath. Id. at

1 Initially,

the Government suggested a less confrontational chambers
meeting with the juror, where she would not be placed under oath
and the Court would ask the questions. But in light of the First
Circuit's direct reference to evidentiary hearing, the parties appear to
be reconciled to a testimonial hearing where the juror will be placed
under oath and be subject to cross-examination.
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*3, n.3. Regarding the juror, Judge Hornby explained that he
"feared that legal proceeding formalities would result in his
refusing to answer questions." Id. at n.3. Judge Homby wrote
that his "focus throughout was on obtaining all the available
information to assess the impartiality of the jury for the trial
just ended, not what might be available for further
proceedings against the individuals [*7] being interviewed."
Id.

of whether the rights are implicated." Id. at 2. The
Government notes that counsel could impress upon Juror 86
the importance of an oath and would provide a point of
contact between the Court and Juror 86. Id. It worries about
"ambushing Juror #86 with questions about [*9] events that
occurred long ago, without the benefit of experienced
counsel." Id.

Indeed, Mr. French assumes that if Juror 86 is represented by
counsel, she will take the Filih Amendment and that if she
does so, the motion for new trial will necessarily be denied.
Hallett Letter at 1 ("Any reasonably competent defense
counsel armed with the information filed in this matter, and
the First Circuit's opinion, will advise her client to assert Fifth
Amendment protection. This Court has already suggested that
assertion of the Filth Amendment will lead to the defendant
failing to establish bias sufficient to excuse the juror for
cause").

3. Discussion

Mr. French is skeptical about the impact of counsel on the
truth-seeking process. He is concerned that an attorney will
deprive the Court and the parties of "the opportunity to assess
[the Juror's] authentic reaction" and that he is "entitled to
answers that have not been filtered or coached, and any
attorney who is appointed to represent Juror 86 will
necessarily have to prepare her for her testimony." Id. at 3. He
asserts that "nothing at all suggests that Juror 86 is a criminal,
or has committed a crime." Id. Finally, he worries that the
Court is requiring newly-appointed counsel to report back to
the Court and the parties about confidential communications
with Juror 86. Id. Instead, [*8] Mr. French suggests that the
Court should have counsel "available to aid Juror 86 in court,
should she request assistance." Id.

2. The Government's Position

The Government holds the view that the Court should appoint
counsel to represent Juror 86. Gov't Letter at 1. It cites
caselaw in which other courts have appointed counsel to
representjurors. /d. It proposes that a lawyer would be helpful
in explaining to the juror why, after five years, she was being
summoned back into court, which would "allow Juror # 86 to
think back on the events leading up to her completion of the
questionnaire and aid her in providing accurate answers." Id.
It rejects the notion that Juror 86 would "use such advance
notice to concoct a false story." Id.
The Government is not certain that counsel would in fact
advise Juror 86 to take the Fifth Amendment and suggests that
consultation with a lawyer would avoid having Juror 86
"erroneously invoking her rights based on a misunderstanding

The Court concludes that it will appoint counsel to represent
Juror 86. The threshold conundrum is how Juror 86 is to be
made aware of the controversy surrounding her voir dire
responses. Her initial responses date back to 2013 and the voir
dire itself occurred in January 2014, and there is no
suggestion she has thought about her answers for more than
four or five years.
Exactly who is going to contact Juror 86 after this length of
time is problematic. Among the concerns is that Juror 86 must
be apprised of the issue before the Court without scaring her
into silence and without influencing her responses by the
contents of the communication. None of the lawyers suggests
that it would be appropriate for them to contact her, either
individually or as a group. Nor would it seem appropriate for
the first contact to be from the United States Marshal's Office
or another person authorized to serve subpoenas. One
alternative would be for the Clerk's Office to write her a
letter, asking her to contact the Office, but the contents of any
letter would have to be very carefully considered to make
certain [*10] it was neutral and accurate. Furthermore, any
Clerk's Office letter would likely provoke a response from the
juror, including contacting the Clerk's Office for more
information, and the Clerk's Office would not be able to
respond in anything but generalities.
The advantages of counsel making the first contact are
considerable. The defense lawyer will immediately grasp the
legal issues presented by the motion for new trial and the First
Circuit opinion and will be able to explain to Juror 86 what is
at stake in the evidentiary hearing. The lawyer will also be
able to refresh Juror 86's recollection about her responses to
the jury questionnaire. This is not a simple matter. The focus
is what motivated Juror 86 in her responses then, not now.
Neither the Court nor counsel knows what has happened in
Juror 86's life over the last four to five years, what has
happened in her son's life over the same time, and whether
she can readily place her mind back to the day she completed
the questionnaire, accurately reflect what she was thinking
then, and then place her mind back to the day of jury selection
and do the same thing. An experienced lawyer should be of
great assistance to Juror 86 in explaining [*11] the issues
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before the Court and in so doing, should assist the Court and
the parties in responding to the First Circuit's order on
remand.
The Court is not nearly as cynical about the role of defense
counsel for Juror 86 as defense counsel for the Defendants
appear to be. The Court's experience with defense counsel is
that they more often facilitate than obstruct the proper
administration of justice.
The Defendants' proposal that the Court should have counsel
ready in the courtroom to represent Juror 86 should she ask
for counsel is, in the Court's view, unworkable. It places the
burden on Juror 86 to know whether and when to request
counsel and the Court is perplexed how counsel could serve
as an "on-call" attorney, without actually representing her,
and yet properly represent Juror 86 if called upon to do so.
Juror 86 may assert her Filth Amendment right to remain
silent. Deliberately lying during voir dire is a crime. Order
Denying Mot. for New Trial at 48 (ECF No. 734) (New Trial
Order); United States v. Colombo. 869 F.2d 149. 151 t2nd
Cir. 1989} ("Knowingly lying during the voir dire, . . .
subjected the juror to possible criminal contempt pursuant to
18 U.S.C. , 401" . Moreover, the French Court wrote:
Here, the defendants came foiward with factual
information fairly [*12] establishing that Juror 86 likely
gave an inaccurate answer to question 3 on the written
questionnaire. Further, the uncontested facts submitted
by the defendants also made it quite likely - - though not
certain - - that the juror's inaccuracy was knowing.
French, 904 F.3d at 117. The First Circuit's comments come
reasonably close to saying that, based on the record before it,
it is more likely than not that Juror 86 knowingly lied during
voir dire, a potential crime. In light of the French Court's
conclusions, Juror 86 could decide to remain silent and, if she
did, she would only be asserting her rights under the United
States Constitution's Billo/ Rights, something neither wrong
nor inappropriate in a federal court.

Attorney Hallett's letter says both that "[a]ny reasonably
competent defense counsel armed with the information filed
in this matter and the First Circuit's opinion, will advise her
client to assert Filth Amendment protection" and that "nothing
at all suggests that Juror 86 is a criminal, or has committed a
crime." Hal/f!tt Letter at 1-2. 2 As Attorney Hallett's

considered ambiguity suggests, it is not a foregone conclusion
that Juror 86 will assert her Filih Amendment rights. There
could be an innocent explanation for her response to question
3 of the jury questionnaire or other circumstances [*13] may
allow her testimony. In addition, there may be some evidence
acceptable to the parties and the Court that falls short of a full
evidentiary hearing. United States v. LaRoque1 No. 4: l 2-cr99-JH 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21170, at *7 tE.D.N.C. Feb.
20 20141 (noting that the defendant submitted an affidavit
from Juror number three in support of the motion for new
trial).
The Court is deeply respectful of Judge Homby and has no
quarrel with his decision in Fuentes not to place the
witnesses, including the juror, under oath and not to provide
counsel for the juror. Fuentes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS J J5459.
But the situation in Fuentes was markedly different than the
situation here. The juror's statement of racial bias against the
defendants was disgraceful, but there was no suggestion that
he had committed a crime by expressing his prejudice. Id. In
fact, Judge Homby found that despite the juror's ethnic slur,
the juror had not lied during voir dire. Id. at *17-19. Here, as
just noted, it is at least possible that Juror 86 could be
prosecuted for contempt of court if she deliberately lied
during the voir dire.
The Defendants are concerned that the Court's prior denial of
their motion for new trial contains language that suggests if
Juror 86 were [*14] to assert the Filth Amendment. it would
doom their motion for new trial. Hallett Letter at 1 ("This
Court has already suggested that assertion of the Fifth
Amendment will lead to the defendant failing to establish bias
sufficient to excuse the juror for cause. Defendant strenuously
disagrees that the invocation of Juror 86's Fifth Amendment
privilege inures to defendant's detriment"). It is true in its
denial of the motion for new trial, the Court wrote that there
were three possibilities, (I) that Juror 86 took the Fifth
Amendment, (2) that she presented an innocent and acceptable
explanation for her responses, or (3) that she looked
"bewildered, expressed embarrassment, and equivocated."
New Trial Order at 48. If the third alternative occurred, the
Court concluded that "the Court and the parties would be no
better off, expect the Defendants would not have sustained
their Sampson burden." Id.
But the First Circuit vacated the Court's November 16, 2016
order on the motion for new trial. French 904 F.3d at 125
("We vacate the order denying motion for new trial")
( emphasis in original). The French Court also wrote, based on
the record before it, not only did Juror 86 give inaccurate

2 In

Mr. French's motion to recuse, Mr. French described Juror 86 as
"potentially mendacious," and wrote that the Court must investigate
her "apparent mendacity." Def. Malcolm French's Mot. to Recuse
Judge Woodcock at 6-7, 8(ECF No. 787). "Mendacity" denotes

"deceptiveness or lying." BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S
MODERN AM. USAGE AT 532 (3rd ed, 2009).
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information, but also that she likely did so lmowingly. Id. at
117.
This Court owes its allegiance to the First Circuit's [*15]
conclusion, although it differs from this Court's view of the
same record; the First Circuit opinion eclipses this Court's
assessment. This being the case, if no additional evidence is
brought to bear, this Court will not be bound by its prior
conclusion that-without further evidence-the Defendants
would not have sustained their Sampson burden. In fact, based
on the First Circuit opinion, the Government, not the
Defendants, would appear to be in greater jeopardy if the
record stays as it now is. However, the Court need not rule on
something that has not occurred and, if it does occur, the
Court will seek the guidance of counsel before issuing a final
ruling on the motion for new trial.
Finally, the Court agrees with the Government that in similar
situations, some courts have appointed counsel for the
allegedly misbehaving juror. United States v. Lawson. 677
F.3d 629, 640 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012) ("In light of the potential
for contempt sanctions, the district court appointed counsel to
advise Juror 177 whether he should testify at the hearing");
United States v. Nix. 256 F. Su11r 3d 272. 275 {W.D.N.Y.
2017) ("[T]he Court indicated that it would hold an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of Juror No. 3's alleged bias.
At a subsequent appearance on May 25, 2017, Juror No. 3
appeared and was appointed counsel. . .. "); [*16] United
States v. I,,,,olito, 313 F. Supp 2d 1310. 1312 (M.D. Fl. 2003)
("I appointed counsel for Juror 505 and summoned him to a
hearing at which every party was pennitted examination"). By
contrast, the Defendants have pointed to no case where a
court denied counsel to a potentially misbehaving juror who
was being called to testify under oath about the alleged
misbehavior.

D. Attorney Hallett's Additional Concerns

In his letter, Attorney Hallett was concerned that the Court
was going to require defense counsel for Juror 86 to "report
back to this Court about the nature of his or her conversation
with Juror 86 without disclosing privileged infonnation. And,
by reporting back, and waiving privilege, Juror 86's attorney
becomes a potential witness in this case." Hallett Letter at 3.
This worry is ahead of itself. The Court suggested that after
counsel was appointed and had consulted with Juror 86, her
lawyer could inform the Court and the parties whether she
was likely to assert the Filth Amendment. United States v.
Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456 474 (]st Cir. 1993J (invocation of
the Fifth Amendment renders a witness "unavailable" for the
purpose of exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay). If the
Court and the parties learn that if called to an evidentiary

hearing, Juror 86 would likely assert the Fi/th Amendment, the
Court would convene a conference of counsel, including Juror
86's [*17] attorney, and discuss the next steps.
Attorney Hallett need not be concerned about Juror 86's
counsel's attorney-client privilege, a privilege that Juror 86's
lawyer could assert on her behalf. The Court is well aware of
Federal Rule o( Evidence 501 and the attorney-client
privilege, and of course, the Court would never contemplate
forcing Juror 86's counsel to reveal privileged client
information. Swidler & Berlin v. United States. 524 U.S. 399.
403, 118 S. Ct. 2081 . 141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (]998) (the attorneyclient privilege "is one of the oldest recognized privileges for
confidential communications"). During the November 20,
2018 conference of counsel, in considering what might
happen, the Court only optimistically mused about the
possibility that Juror 86's attorney might make a proffer that
could satisfy the Court and the parties about Juror 86's
motivation in answering question 3 as she did. But the Court
did not intend to imply, if it did, that it would require Juror
86's attorney to reveal client confidences.

Ill. CONCLUSION

The Court will appoint counsel to represent Juror 86 in any
proceedings involving Defendant Malcolm French's and
Rodney Russell's motion for new trial, including any
evidentiary hearing held pursuant to the First Circuit remand
order. The Court's appointment order will include an 1*18}
order that releases to Juror 86's counsel the juror information
about Juror 86, including her initial juror response, which
includes her personal contact information, and her incomplete
questionnaire. Juror 86 is not required to accept courtappointed counsel; she may be more comfortable paying her
own lawyer to represent her, requesting the Court to pay her
own lawyer, or she may decline representation. Once counsel
has been appointed, has become familiarized with the case,
and has contacted and met with Juror 86, the Court will ask
Juror 861s attorney to contact the Court and the Court will
convene another conference of counsel.
SO ORDERED.

Isl John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of November, 2018
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